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DETERMINES THAT SPEAKING SPANISH IS
NOT AN ISSUE OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND
MISAPPLIES THE MOUNT HEALTHY TEST
TO A PRIOR RESTRAINT CLAIM
Leah Bhimani*
N the past year, a startling number of small towns throughout the
United States have enacted English-only ordinances that prohibit the
choice of language that government employees may use in the work-
place.1 Many other city councils, state legislatures, and the Senate are
considering enacting similar English-only legislation.2 These laws serve as
a prior restraint on government employee speech and implicate the First
Amendment rights of bilingual employees. In Maldonado v. City of Altus,
the Tenth Circuit held that a municipality's implementation of an En-
glish-only policy did not violate the First Amendment rights of bilingual
city employees. 3 The court erred by incorrectly determining that the
speech involved did not constitute an issue of public concern as a matter
of law, and then used the wrong test to analyze the speech. The English-
only policy placed an ex-ante restriction 4 on government employee
speech, therefore the court should have utilized the National Treasury
Employees Union test.5 This misapplication could have serious implica-
tions for challenges of other English-only laws limiting government em-
ployee speech.
* J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. and B.B.A., 2003, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma. Special thanks to Michael, for all his love and support. Also, many
thanks to Rose Cuisorn Villazor for her guidance and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sept. 8, 2006); Valley Park, Mo., Ordi-
nance 1708 (July 17, 2006); Borough of Bridgeport, Pa., Borough of Bridgeport Official
English Ordinance (Oct. 2006); Farmers Branch, Tex., Resolution No. 2006-130 (Nov. 13,
2006); Taneytown, Md., Resolution 2006-28 (Nov. 13, 2006).
2. See Wendy Koch, Efforts to Make English 'Official' Language Heat Up, USA To-
DAY, Oct. 9, 2006, at A8.
3. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1310 (10th Cir. 2006).
4. "Ex ante" is used to refer to prior restraints on employee speech; "ex post" is'used
to describe retaliatory actions taken by government employers in response to speech that
has already taken place.
5. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 481 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Employees of the City of Altus, Oklahoma ("the City") claimed that in
early 2002, the City's Street Commissioner told his bilingual subordinates
that they could no longer speak Spanish at work, and that the City would
soon be implementing a formal English-only policy.6 A group of the af-
fected employees ("the employees") sent a letter to the city administrator
expressing. opposition to the policy and formally filing a discrimination
complaint. 7 They emphasized their pride in their heritage, their feelings
that an ability to communicate in a bilingual manner did not hinder their
work, and asserted that speaking Spanish had never affected their per-
formance of job duties.8 Nonetheless, in July 2002 the City promulgated
an official policy requiring that all employees speak only English while
conducting city business, unless speaking to a person with limited English
skills.9 The policy provided exceptions for lunch breaks and personal
phone calls, but at trial the employees offered evidence that the City ig-
nored these exceptions in practice.' 0 Although the City had not disci-
plined anyone for violation of the policy, the employees brought suit.1 '
The City offered three primary reasons for adopting the policy: (1) to
assure that all employees could understand what was being said over the
City's radios; (2) some employees felt uncomfortable when co-workers
spoke a language that they could not understand; and (3) safety concerns
about a non-common language being used around machinery. 12 The City,
however, could provide no written record of any communication, morale
or safety problems resulting from the use of languages other than English
prior to the implementation of the policy.' 3 The testimony of city officials
indicated that "at least one" employee had complained to supervisors
about co-workers speaking Spanish, but the use of a language other than
English had never caused a safety incident. 14
The employees brought claims against the City for disparate-impact,
disparate-treatment, discrimination on the basis of race and national ori-
gin, intentional discrimination, and deprivation of equal protection and
freedom of speech rights.' 5 The district court granted summary judgment
on all counts and the employees appealed to the Tenth Circuit.' 6
The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City on the First
Amendment claim based on its conclusion that the employees could not
satisfy the first, or likely the third, prong of the Pickering-Mount Healthy
test.' 7 These prongs require that the prohibited speech touch on matters
6. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298.
7. Id. at 1299.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1300.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Dist. Ct. Order at 6, R. Vol. III at 875).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1298.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1309.
[Vol. 60
Casenote
of public concern and that prohibited expression was a motivating factor
in a detrimental employment decision. 18
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public school board fired a
teacher for writing a letter to the editor of the local paper criticizing the
school board's handling of budgeting.19 The Supreme Court balanced the
interest of the teacher in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the school's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs. 20 The Court concluded that the teacher's exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance could not be the basis of his dismis-
sal from public employment. 21 In Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, a public school declined to renew a
teacher's employment contract after he relayed to a radio station the con-
tents of a memo to teachers addressing teacher dress and appearance.22
The Mount Healthy court added to the Pickering test a requirement that
the employee demonstrate that constitutionally protected speech was a
motivating factor in the school's decision not to rehire him. The school
then had the opportunity to prove that it would have reached the same
employment decision in the absence of the constitutionally protected
speech.23
The Tenth Circuit applied the Pickering-Mount Healthy test to the case
at bar based on its precedent in Schalk v. Gallemore.2 4 The four-prong
test requires that:
(1) The court determine whether the speech touches on a matter of
public concern.2 5
(2) If it does, the court must balance the interest of the employee in
making the statement and the public employer's interest in effec-
tively providing public services. 26
(3) If the preceding requirements are met, the employee must show
that the protected speech was a motivating factor in the detrimental
18. Id. at 1309-10.
19. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
20. Id. at 568.
21. Id. at 574.
22. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
23. Id. at 287. Both Pickering and Mount Healthy were cases of retaliatory action
based on employee speech.
24. Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1990). The two cases establishing
the Pickering-Mount Healthy test in the Tenth Circuit were Schalk v. Gallemore and Mel-
ton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir. 1989) reh'g granted on other
grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1989). Both were ex-post cases of retaliatory action taken
against a government employee due to her speech. In Schalk, a municipal hospital em-
ployee was reprimanded by her supervisor for writing a letter to the hospital board criticiz-
ing the hospital's administration. Schalk, 906 F.2d at 493. She was later terminated for
talking to a hospital board member about her concerns. Id. The Schalk court applied the
Pickering-Mount Healthy test in its analysis, and concluded that the employee's speech was
protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 494-96, 499. In Melton, a police officer was
dismissed from his job because he testified on behalf of a criminal defendant. Melton, 879
F.2d at 711-12. The Tenth Circuit analyzed the case under the Mount Healthy-Pickering
test and held that the officer's speech received First Amendment protection. Id. at 713-17.
25. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).




(4) The employer then has the opportunity to demonstrate that it
would have made the same employment decision in the absence of
the protected speech.28
The court's analysis focused on the first and third prongs of the test in
the present case.2 9 Under the first prong, speech touches on a matter of
public concern when it communicates a message that informs the debate
on an issue of public interest.30 "Whether an employee's speech addresses
a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. '31 The
majority held that no evidence supported the employees' assertion that
their choice of language expressed ethnic pride, or even communicated
any message whatsoever, because their conversations in Spanish while at
work concerned mundane subjects. The dissent pointed out that the court
failed to examine the form and context of the speech in making its deter-
mination.32 A person's choice of language, or the form of the speech, can
convey a powerful message. 33 The dissent also indicated that the record
showed that the speech took place in the context of intense debate about
the English-only policy in Altus, tensions between Hispanic and non-His-
panic employees ran high in the City offices, and race relations had be-
come an issue of public debate. 34
The majority then addressed the third prong of the test, observing that
"[h]ow to translate this prong to the context of an ex ante prohibition, as
opposed to imposition of an ex post sanction, is not obvious. '35 To solve
the problem, the court created a new rule, purportedly deduced from the
Mount Healthy standard, that a restriction on speech does not violate the
First Amendment if those imposing the restriction lack the intent to pre-
clude communications on matters of public concern. 36 The majority then
held that the City did not violate the First Amendment because it could
find no evidence of any intent by the City to quash such
communications. 37
The dissent correctly identified the majority's failure to apply the ap-
propriate test, set forth in United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union ("NTEU"). 38 In NTEU, the Supreme Court held that a law
prohibiting any federal employee from receiving honoraria for speeches,
27. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
28. Id.
29. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1310 (10th Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 1310.
31. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
32. Id. at 1320 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Id. at 1319.
34. Id. at 1318-21.
35. Id. at 1313.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1316-17 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United
States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) ("NTEU").
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articles or public appearances violated the First Amendment. 39 At the
time the employees filed the claim, the government had not taken action
against any employee under the new law. In its analysis, the NTEU Court
first determined that respondents' expressive activities fell within the pro-
tected category of comment on matters of public concern.40 It then ap-
plied a modified form of the Pickering balancing test.4 The Court
distinguished NTEU from Pickering because of the ex ante restriction on
speech-"unlike Pickering and its progeny, this case does not involve a
post hoc analysis of one employee's speech .... *42 It differentiated the
two types of cases because "unlike an adverse action taken in response to
actual speech, [an ex ante] ban chills potential speech before it happens
.... [Therefore,] the Government's burden is greater with respect to this
statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disci-
plinary action."'43
The majority in Maldonado v. City of Altus erred at every level of its
analysis of the employees' First Amendment claim. It disregarded crucial
evidence when it incorrectly determined that the speech did not consti-
tute an issue of public concern, applied the wrong test for analyzing the
claim, and should not have reached consideration of the third prong of
the Mount Healthy test. In deciding the threshold issue-whether the re-
stricted speech touched on a matter of public concern-the court only
analyzed the content of the employee's speech before concluding that no
evidence supported the proposition that employees spoke on a matter of
public concern.44 It failed to consider the form (Spanish) or context (the
race relations tension in Altus and the public debate over the English-
only policy) of the speech, as required by Connick v. Myers.45 As the
dissent points out, the majority completely ignored the record's evidence
that choice of language was a heavily debated issue in Altus.46 Addition-
ally, the majority inexplicably dismissed the employees' letter to the City
prior to filing suit by holding that employees provided no evidence that
conversations in Spanish communicated ethnic pride or commented on
City policies.47
Once the Tenth Circuit reached the conclusion that the employees'
speech did not touch on an issue of public concern, it should have ended
39. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457.
40. Id. at 466.
41. Id. at 467. The Court in NTEU combined elements from Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1963), resulting in a test that
balances the employee's interest to speak on matters of public concern with the state's
interest in efficient employment. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467.
42. Id. at 466-67.
43. Id. at 468.
44. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1313-14.
45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
46. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1316 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also, Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990) (establishing that
the court should consider outside sources reflected in the record, such as local news arti-
cles, to determine whether an issue is a local topic of public concern).
47. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1311.
2007]
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its examination of the First Amendment claim. 48 Instead, the court again
erred by misapplying the ex-post Mount Healthy test to Maldonado's ex-
ante facts.
It was difficult for the court to apply the Mount Healthy test to the facts
of the case because it applied the wrong test; the NTEU test was the
appropriate test.49 As evident from the language of the test, the Mount
Healthy prongs only apply to cases in which a public employer has taken
retaliatory action against an employee.50 In all previous decisions, the
Tenth Circuit 5 1-and every other Circuit in the country-has only ap-
plied the Mount Healthy test to cases where a public employer has taken
some retaliatory action against an employee.52 As recently as 2003, the
Tenth Circuit stated that "[i]mplicit in the Pickering [Mount Healthy] test
is a requirement that the public employer have taken some adverse em-
ployment action against the employee." 53 In the present case, no such
retaliatory action had been taken by the city; Maldonado presents a prior
restraint case, which should be analyzed under the NTEU test.54
Rather than apply the correct test, NTEU, the court altered the Mount
Healthy test to require a showing of the public employer's intent to quash
protected speech.55 By creating this new intent requirement for ex ante
restrictions on speech, the court dramatically increased the burden for
any government employee who believes her First Amendment rights have
been violated. This outcome directly contradicts the Supreme Court's
stated purpose in NTEU: "the Government's burden is greater with re-
spect to [a] statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an
isolated disciplinary action"56 because a prior restraint "constitutes a
wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression," 57 "gives rise to
48. See Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 713 (stating that the court only
arrives at analyzing the Mount Healthy prongs once both previous elements-the Connick
and Pickering elements-have been found in favor of the plaintiff).
49. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1316 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
50. See id. at 1309 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977)).
51. See, e.g., Belcher v. City of McAlester, 324 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003); Hulen
v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2003); Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ., 215 F.3d
1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2000); Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 2000).
52. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1318 n.1 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
53. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1207 n.4.
54. See, Margaret Robertson, Abridging the Freedom of Non-English Speech: English-
Only Legislation and the Free Speech Rights of Government Employees, 2001 BYU L. REV.
1641, 1649 (2001)
("NTEU... dealt with an ex ante general prohibition on a certain category
of speech, where the precise content of the deterred speech was unknown
and, because the speech had not yet been made, the adverse impact of the
prohibited speech on efficient and effective employment had not been ob-
served. The Court therefore reworked the Pickering test for application to an
"ex ante prohibition" on speech, a category into which English-only statutes
would fall.").
55. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1313.
56. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995).
57. Id. at 454.
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far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision" and
"chill[s] potential speech before it happens. ' 58 In the great number of
cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed the First Amendment
rights of government employees, it has never considered the intent of the
government to curtail protected speech. The Tenth Circuit seems to draw
this standard out of thin air, unable to cite to any authority or
precedent. 59
The court rationalized applying the Pickering-Mount Healthy to this
case by stating that it could not apply NTEU because the speech did not
deal with matters of public concern.60 But under both the Pickering-
Mount Healthy test and the NTEU test, determination that the speech
was a matter of public concern is a prerequisite to further analysis. The
court also bases its application of the Pickering-Mount Healthy test on
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in NTEU.6 1 In her concurrence,
however, O'Connor says only that no distinction should be made between
ex-ante and ex-post limitations on speech in the application of the Picker-
ing balancing test62-which is also encompassed in both the Pickering-
Mount Healthy test and the NTEU test.
In Maldonado v. City of Altus, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly determined
that the employee speech did not constitute an issue of public concern as
a matter of law. It then misapplied the Mount Healthy test, splitting with
its own previous decisions and the precedent of every other circuit in the
country. Through its misapplication, the court has created a new test that
directly contradicts the stated policy determinations of the Supreme
Court, and provides a significant obstacle for government employees
seeking to challenge a regulation limiting their speech. This unprece-
dented burden comes at a time when an increasing number of cities are
passing English-only restraints on government employee speech. The
Tenth Circuit, instead, should have adopted the dissent's well-reasoned
opinion reversing summary judgment, and thus allowed the employees
their chance to be heard.
58. Id. at 468.
59. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1313.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissent-
ing in part).
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